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Causal loops, e.g., in time travel, come with two main problems. Most prominently, the grandfather
antinomy describes the potentiality to inconsistencies; a problem of logical nature. The other
problem is called information antinomy and is lesser known. Yet, it describes a variant of the former:
There are not too few consistent solutions—namely none—, but too many. At a first glance, the
information antinomy does not seem as problematic as the grandfather antinomy, because there is
no apparent logical contradiction. In this work we show that, however, both problems are equivalent
under interventions: If parties can intervene in such a way that the information antinomy arises,
then they can also intervene to generate a contradiction, and vice versa.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND,
MOTIVATION, AND RESULTS
Causal loops are loops in cause-effect relations such
that some event Q not only is an effect of another
event P—it’s cause—, but also is the cause of P . The
discussion on causal loops entered the realm of physics
more than a century ago. Einstein [1], while developing
the theory of general relativity, expressed his doubt that
in general relativity time travel might be possible: Every
world line in special relativity is not closed, the same can-
not be said about general relativity. After Einstein asked
Carathe´odory [2, 3] to resolve this question, Lanczos [4],
others (see, e.g., Ref. [5]), and most notably Go¨del [6]
found solutions to the equations of general relativity that
describe causal loops. In Go¨del’s words: “[I]f P,Q are any
two points on a world line of matter, and P precedes Q
on this line, there exists a time-like line connecting P
and Q on which Q precedes P ; i.e., it is theoretically
possible in these worlds to travel into the past, or oth-
erwise influence the past” [6]. In the ’90s, researchers
around Thorne and Novikov started to investigate such
causal loops and asked whether causal loops might lead
to inconsistencies. E.g., is it possible that a time travel-
ling billiard ball kicks its younger self off course in such
a way that the younger self does not time travel? [7, 8]
Towards answering this question, Novikov formulated the
self-consistency principle [7, 9] which states that only self-
consistent solution to the dynamics on a causal loop occur
and that locally, physics is kept unchanged. This means
that the physical laws must be invariant under the ab-
sence or presence of a causal loops.1 At the same time,
by approaching causal loops from a circuit diagrammatic
1 Note that the self-consistency principle without this addendum
is trivial: In case of inconsistent dynamics we simply change the
description of the physical world, e.g., by allowing for parallel
universes, such that every inconsistent solution becomes a con-
sistent one.
point of view, Deutsch [10] argued that with the help of
quantum theory inconsistencies can be overcome. A later
developed model for time travel based on circuits incor-
porates quantum theory to overcome this issue as well,
yet in a different way (see, e.g., Refs. [11–16]).
Within the last decade, causal loops became a topic
of research again. During the studies of higher-order
quantum maps, i.e., quantum maps of quantum maps,
and among other frameworks [17, 18], the process-matrix
framework was developed [19]. A key feature of that lat-
ter framework is that it allows for correlations among dis-
tant parties that cannot be simulated causally. Causal in-
equalities [20–23] limit the space of possible correlations
where the parties cannot communicate through causal
loops. That framework, however, leads to violations of
such Bell-like causal inequalities. Moreover, the classical
special case of that quantum framework violates causal
inequalities as well [24]; the framework leads to causal
loops [25, 26].
Most of preceding work tries to exclude inconsistencies
from causal loops. This problem of inconsistencies is fa-
mously known as the grandfather antinomy. The story to
illustrate that problem is the following, where we divert
from the usual homicide plot to a technicide plot. Imag-
ine a robot is programmed in such a way to travel to the
past to encounter its younger self. Once the robot meets
its younger self, it disassembles it. So, if the robot time
travels, the robot does not time travel. But now, since
the robot does not time travel, it will time travel, etc.: a
logical contradiction. A simple instance of this problem
is obtained with a NOT gate, where a bit is flipped and
then looped back (see Fig. 1a). Note that throughout
this article, a loop is not a feedback loop but of logical
nature instead.
Another problem, albeit lesser known, arises if too
many consistent solutions occur. This problem is known
as the information antinomy and also carries different
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2(a) This schematic representation of the
grandfather antinomy shows a causal loop where a
bit is flipped. If, before the NOT gate, the bit
takes value a, then it takes value ¬a after. Then
again, ¬a is looped back, which means that before
the NOT gate, it takes value ¬a: a logical
contradiction.
(b) This schematic representation of the
information antinomy shows a causal loop where a
bit is kept unchanged. If, before the identity gate,
the bit takes value a, then it takes value a after.
Then again, a is looped back. Now, both
values a = 0 as well as a = 1 are consistent
solutions. Yet, what is the value of a?
Figure 1: Schematic representations of the grandfather
and of the information antinomy.
names2 such as bootstrapping paradox, uniqueness ambi-
guity [16, 27], or ontological paradox [28]. This problem
is often illustrated with the following story. Imagine a
person wakes up one morning and finds, next to the bed,
a book that contains a proof of a longstanding mathemat-
ical problem. Later, this person travels to the past and
places the book she or he found next to her or his bed.
If we analyse this story, we see that the book is given to
that person by her/himself. Yet, this story is problem-
atic for two reasons. Firstly, where does this proof come
from? We have complex information that arises out of
nowhere.3 Secondly, why is the proof written in that way
as it is written? It could have been written in any other
language, or, more drastically, the book might contain
a proof for another longstanding mathematical problem.
Both problems we just discussed, however, are the same.
Given the boundary conditions multiple consistent out-
comes might occur (see Fig. 1b). A theory suffering from
the information antinomy thus fails to provide predic-
tions, even probabilistically [16].
However, one might consider the information antinomy
as less severe when compared to the grandfather anti-
nomy. The reason for such a judgement is often that
2 Already the multitude of names given to that problem suggests
its inferiority when compared to the grandfather antinomy.
3 Deutsch considers this problem as more severe compared to the
grandfather antinomy and rejects it as creationism [10].
the grandfather antinomy embodies a logical contradic-
tion, while the information antinomy seems, from a log-
ical point of view, unproblematic. In this work we put
light on this dichotomy and show that both problems
are equivalent: They form two sides of the same coin.
This equivalence holds if the dynamics allow for inter-
vention, i.e., parties that are free to apply local transfor-
mations. We show this equivalence in the deterministic
setting without referring neither to probability nor to
quantum theory. The core in showing this equivalence is
a result complementary to one from Ref. [29]. In Ref. [29]
it is shown that, if for any choice of interventions parties
can make, consistent solutions always exist, then the so-
lution to the dynamics is unique. Phrased differently,
that result states that if no grandfather antinomy arises,
then only a single consistent solution to the dynamics
exists. From this follows that the information antinomy
does not arise neither. In this article we show that, if for
any choice of interventions parties can make, no informa-
tion antinomy arises (i.e., not more than one consistent
solution exists), then, just as in the previous case, the
solution to the dynamics is unique. From this, again,
it follows that the absence of the information antinomy
implies the absence of the grandfather antinomy.
Before we present the outline of this article we reflect
on how the information antinomy arises in previous ar-
ticles. In the mathematical experiments where billiard
balls are thrown into a time machine, consistent dynam-
ics were always found. Yet, surprisingly, the authors
discovered that “dangerous” boundary conditions lead
to an infinity of consistent dynamics [8]. In Deutsch’s
model [10], then again, the information antinomy is mit-
igated by defining that the unique solution is the uni-
form mixture of all consistent solutions. In contrast, the
process-matrix framework [19] seems not to suffer from
this antinomy. That is the case at least in the classical
special case thereof [24]: The grandfather as well as the
information antinomy never arises [30].
In the next section we describe causal models and pro-
vide the necessary definitions. After that we show the
above stated uniqueness results, from which the equiva-
lence follows. Finally, we conclude.
II. CAUSAL STRUCTURE AND
INTERVENTIONS
The reader interested on causal models is referred to
the book by Pearl [31] and to the recent articles, e.g.,
to Refs. [26, 32, 33]. We need some notation before we
can define the relevant mathematical objects. Let G =
(V,E) be a directed graph, where V ⊆ N denotes the
set of vertices and where E is a relation describing the
edges: (u, v) ∈ E if and only if there is an edge from u
to v. For a vertex v, the set Pa(v) := {u ∈ V | (u, v) ∈ E}
is the set of all parents of v. A vertex u is called an
ancestor of v if there exists a directed path from u to v.
The set of ancestors of v is defined as An(v). Since we are
3dealing with deterministic dynamics we define a causal
structure as follows:
Definition 1 (Causal structure). A causal structure is
a tuple (G,X, µ) where
• G = (V,E) is a directed graph,
• X is a family of sets {Xv | |Xv| ≥ 2}v∈V , and
• µ is a family of functions
{µv : ×
u∈Pa(v)
Xu → Xv}v∈V .
The parents of a vertex v are the causes of the effect v.
The value every vertex takes is computed from a function
of all its parents. The condition that every vertex can
take at least two values, i.e., the condition |Xv| ≥ 2 for
all v ∈ V , is natural: A vertex v that can take only one
value cannot be considered a cause nor an effect. For a
vertex v with zero in degree, µv is a trivial function, i.e.,
a constant.
To allow for interventions, and similarly to the classi-
cal interventional model of Ref. [32] or the classical split
nodes of Ref. [33], we augment a causal structure to incor-
porate interventions.4 The main idea is that every party
is a vertex i and can freely choose5 the function µi. Fur-
thermore, if we remove all incoming edges to the parties,
then the graph is acyclic.
Definition 2 (Causal structure with interventions and
induced function). A causal structure with interventions
is a tuple (G,X, µ \ {µv}v∈P , P ) where
• (G,X, µ) is a causal structure,
• P ⊆ V is a non-empty set of parties, and
• (V,E \ {(u, v) ∈ E | v ∈ P}) is an acyclic graph.
For every party i ∈ P we define
• the input space as Ii :=×j∈Pa(i)Xj , and the out-
put space as Oi := Xi,
• the intervention of party i as a function fi : Ii →
Oi of his or her choice, and
• the induced function for party i as ωi :×j∈P Oj →
Ii, where, by starting at the vertexes from the
set Pa(i), we successively apply the functions
from µ until we reach all ancestors of the ver-
texes in Pa(i) with respect to the directed acyclic
graph (V,E \ {(u, v) ∈ E | v ∈ P}).
4 We divert from the definitions in the mentioned articles in order
to be more general; for split nodes the “input” and “output” of
a party are elements from the same set. Any causal structure
with split nodes can be transformed into a causal structure as
we define it here.
5 By this local physics does not depend on whether the causal
structure is cyclic or acyclic (see Section I). What we mean by
“freely choose” is that every intervention is possible.
The |P |-party induced function ω is defined as the list ω =
(ωi)i∈P and has signature×i∈P Oi →×i∈P Ii. Upon in-
tervention {fi}i∈P , consistent assignment of values to the
vertexes exists if and only if ∃{xv}v∈V such that for every
party i the value xi equals fi applied to the correspond-
ing values, and for every vertex v ∈ V \ P the value xv
is equal to µx applied to the corresponding values.
An example of such a causal structure is shown in
Fig. 2. Note that the induced function for a party i de-
Figure 2: An example of a causal structure with
interventions. Here, the vertexes 4 and 7 represent the
parties. Thus, party 4 can intervene on the function
along the edge from 3 to 4, and party 7 can intervene
by specifying the function f7 : X2 ×X6 → X7.
pends only on the values of the vertexes An(i)∩P . Still,
we define the domain of ωi as the Cartesian product of all
sets Xj with j ∈ P . This is helpful because it allows us
to treat all induced functions for all parties on an equal
footing, and by that, to define the function ω. Having
this, and by using the labels 1 to n for the parties, we
can move all the vertexes and edges from the graph into
a box and draw a diagram as shown in Fig. 3. Now, a
𝑓" 𝑓# 𝑓$… 𝑓$%"
𝑖" 𝑖# 𝑖$%" 𝑖$
𝑜" 𝑜# 𝑜$%" 𝑜$ 𝜔
Figure 3: A pictorial depiction of the objects of the
framework. Here, the parties’ interventions fi are drawn
as boxes. The directed acyclic
graph (V,E \ {(u, v) ∈ E | v ∈ P}) is hidden in the box
labeled by ω.
consistent assignment of values to the vertexes exists if
4and only if the function ω ◦ (f1, . . . , fn) has a fixed point,
i.e.,
∃i1, . . . , in : (i1, . . . , in) = ω(f1(i1), . . . , fn(in)) . (1)
III. THE GRANDFATHER AND THE
INFORMATION ANTINOMY
To present the information and the grandfather anti-
nomy in this framework, let us first fix some notation,
following that of Ref. [29]. We define the objects bar-
ing no index as the collection of objects, e.g., the in-
puts i = (i1, i2, · · · , in) ∈ I = I1 × I2 × · · · × In, the
outputs o = (o1, o2, · · · , on) ∈ O = O1 × O2 × · · · ×
On, and the interventions f = (f1, f2, . . . , fn). If we
wish to remove a component k, then we use the nota-
tion I\k = I1 × I2 × · · · Ik−1 × Ik+1 × · · · × In etc. We
will make abuse of notation for simplicity whenever we
write ω(o\k, ok) or similarly. This expression reads as
ω(o1, o2, . . . , ok−1, ok, ok+1, . . . , on). Also, we will make
use of the expression ωk(o\k, ok) = ωk(o\k), which is a
short-hand expression to denote the independence of ωk
from the argument ok:
∀a, b,∈ Ok, o\k ∈ O\k : ωk(o\k, a) = ωk(o\k, b) . (2)
The grandfather antinomy arises if there exists a choice
of interventions for the parties such that no consistent
assignment of values to the vertexes exist (see Fig. 4a).
Formally, this is defined as follows.
Definition 3 (Grandfather antinomy and process func-
tion). An n-party induced function ω suffers from the
grandfather antinomy if and only if
∃f : |{i | i = ω(f(i))}| = 0 . (3)
If an n-party induced function ω does not suffer from the
grandfather antinomy, then we call ω an n-party process
function.
This means that in the cases where no grandfather
antinomy arises, we are guaranteed to have at least one
fixed point for every intervention. The name process
function is adequate because, as is seen at the end of this
article, these functions form the set of classical and deter-
ministic process-matrices [19, 30]. The situation where
the information antinomy arises is described by an in-
duced function ω where multiple consistent assignments
of values to the vertexes exist (see Fig. 4b).
Definition 4 (Information antinomy and pseudo process
function). An n-party induced function ω suffers from
the information antinomy if and only if
∃f : |{i | i = ω(f(i))}| ≥ 2 . (4)
If an n-party induced function ω does not suffer from the
information antinomy, then we call ω an n-party pseudo
process function.
(a) If the function ω is the identity and the
operation of the party is to flip the inputs, then
there is no fixed point (grandfather antinomy).
(b) If both f and ω are the identity channel,
then every possible input is a fixed point. If
the input variable i is binary then there are two
fixed points (information antinomy).
Figure 4: Examples of antinomies
When there is no information antinomy, that means
that the function describing such scenarios has at most
one fixed point for every choice of intervention. It was
shown in Ref. [29] that every process functions always has
a unique fixed point for every choice of intervention f .
Here we extend that result to pseudo process functions:
Theorem 1. Given an n-party (pseudo) process func-
tion ω, there always exists a unique fixed point for every
choice of intervention f = (f1, ..., fn).
We prove this theorem in the next section. A corollary
of that theorem is our main message:
Corollary 1. The grandfather antinomy is equivalent
to the information antinomy under intervention. More
precisely, let ω be an induced function, then
ω suffers from the grandfather antinomy
⇐⇒
ω suffers from the information antinomy.
This means that, if there exists an intervention f such
we can produce the grandfather antinomy in ω, then
there also exists some intervention f ′ to produce the in-
formation antinomy, and vice versa.
5IV. PROPERTIES OF (PSEUDO) PROCESS
FUNCTIONS
Here, we derive the properties of pseudo process func-
tions and restate certain result from Ref. [29] that hold
for both process as well as pseudo process functions.
Recently, some process functions have been character-
ized [34].
Lemma 1. For an n-party (pseudo) process function ω,
each component ωk : O → Ik must be constant over Ok,
i.e.,
∀a, b ∈ Ok, o\k ∈ O\k : ωk(o\k, ) = ωk(o\k, b) . (5)
Proof. Let ω be a (pseudo) process function, and let o˜\k ∈
O\k be some fixed input to ω for all parties except for
party k. This allows us to define the function h : Ok →
Ik as h : x 7→ ωk(x, o˜\k). Showing that ω is constant
now boils down in showing that h is constant for all o˜\k.
Assume towards a contradiction that, for the given o˜\k, h
is not a constant, i.e., there exist two values x 6= y such
that
a := h(x) 6= h(y) =: b . (6)
Now, we design the interventions such that, in the case
where ω is a process function, ω ◦ f has no fixed point,
and in the other case, ω ◦ f has at least two fixed points.
In both cases, the intervention of every party ` 6= k
is f`(z) := o˜`. This intervention is a constant function
and generates the input o˜\k. For party k, in the former
case (ω is assumed to be a process function), the inter-
vention is
fk : z 7→
{
y if z = a
x otherwise.
(7)
Indeed, in this case, ω ◦ f has no fixed point:
∀i\k : ω ◦ f(a, i\k) = ω(fk(a), o˜\k) (8)
= ω(y, o˜\k) = (b, i˜\k) , (9)
and
∀i\k, z 6= a : ω ◦ f(z, i\k) = ω(fk(z), o˜\k) (10)
= ω(x, o˜\k) = (a, i˜\k) , (11)
where we do not need to further specify i˜\k; that ω◦f has
no fixed point is evident by looking at the k-th component
only.
In the latter case (ω is assumed to be a pseudo process
function), the intervention of party k is
fk : z 7→
{
x if z = a
y otherwise.
(12)
Now, we define
α` := ω`
(
fk(a), o˜\k
)
, (13)
β` := ω`
(
fk(b), o˜\k
)
, (14)
and we observe that (a, α\k) as well as (b, β\k) are two
distinct fixed points of ω ◦ f :
(a, α\k) = ω
(
fk(a), f\k(α\k)
)
, (15)
(b, β\k) = ω
(
fk(b), f\k(β\k)
)
. (16)
This holds for every k and for every o˜\k.
This result, being true for both process and pseudo
process functions, has a clear physical interpretation: A
party cannot signal back to her or himself. Furthermore,
it has an implication on single-party (pseudo) process
functions:
Corollary 2. A single-party function ω : O → I is a
(pseudo) process function if and only if ω is a constant.
Proof. The “only if” case is a direct consequence of the
previous lemma. For the “if” case, let ω be a constant.
Then it clearly has a unique fixed point from which it
follows that ω is a single-party (pseudo) process function.
Note that this is a direct implication of the definitions
of process function (at least one fixed point) and pseudo
process function (at most one fixed point) combined with
the requirement of consistency with arbitrary interven-
tions. If we were interested, for example, in at least or
at most two fixed points, Corollary 2 would not be nec-
essarily true.
In further discussions, we will make use of reduced
functions (see Fig. 5):
𝑓! 𝑓" 𝑓#… 𝑓#$!
𝑖! 𝑖" 𝑖#$! 𝑖#
𝑜! 𝑜" 𝑜#$! 𝑜# 𝜔 𝜔!!
Figure 5: The reduced function ωfn is obtained by
plugging in the intervention fn for party n.
Definition 5 (Reduced function). Consider an n-party
function ω : O → I, with O = O1 × · · · × On and I =
I1×· · ·×In, such that for every party k, ωk(o) = ωk(o\k),
i.e., ωk is constant over Ok. For a fixed intervention fk :
Ik → Ok of party k, we define the reduced function ωfk
where the k-th party has been “swallowed,” as ωfk :
O\k → I\k with ωfk = (ωfk1 , · · · , ωfkk−1, ωfkk+1, · · · , ωfkn ).
6Each component ` 6= k is given by the composition of ω
with fk:
ωfk` : O\k → I` (17)
o\k 7→ ω`
(
o\k, fk(ωk(o\k))
)
. (18)
Since, according to Lemma 1, each component of
a (pseudo) process function is constant over the same
party’s input, we can use the just stated definition and
show that fixed points are preserved for reduced functions
and vice versa:
Lemma 2. Let an (2 ≤ n)-party function ω : O → I be
such that for every party k, ωk(o) = ωk(o\k), then
1. if i ∈ I is a fixed point of ω ◦ f for some f , then,
for every k, i\k is a fixed point of ωfk ◦ f\k,
2. if i\k ∈ I\k is a fixed point of ωfk ◦ f\k for some f
and for some k, then, (ik, i\k) is a fixed point of ω◦
f with ik = ωk(f\k(i\k)).
Proof. We start with the first statement. The idea is to
express part k of the fixed point as a function of ωk,
and then we plug it into the expression of the reduced
function. So, we have the identity ik = ωk(f\k(i\k)).
Now, for every ` 6= k, the previous definition implies
ωfk` ◦ f\k(i\k) = ω`
(
f\k(i\k), fk(ik)
)
(19)
= w` ◦ f(i) = i` . (20)
For the second statement, we extend the fixed point i\k
with ωk(f\k(i\k)) for the k-th component, and then show
that this extended fixed point i is a fixed point of ω ◦ f .
For the k-th component, this follows from the definition
on how we have defined ik: ik = ωk ◦ f(i). For every
component ` 6= k, we have, from the premise, that
i` = ω
fk
` ◦ f\k(i\k) . (21)
This, by definition of the reduced function, is equal to
ω` ◦
(
f\k(i\k), fk(ωk(f\k(i\k)))
)
. (22)
Now, by definition of ik, this expression is equal to
ω` ◦
(
f\k(i\k), fk(ik)
)
= ω` ◦ f(i) . (23)
We can relax that lemma to arrive at the following
convenient form:
Corollary 3. Let an (2 ≤ n)-party function ω : O → I
be such that for every party k, ωk(o) = ωk(o\k), then
1. if for some f the function ω ◦ f has two ore more
fixed points, then there exists a party k such that
the function ωfk ◦ f\k has two or more fixed points.
2. if for some f the function ω ◦ f has no fixed point,
then for all parties k the function ωfk ◦ f\k has no
fixed point.
Proof. For the first statement, let i, i′ be two fixed points
of ω ◦ f that differ at position `. The proof is concluded
by using the first part of the previous lemma and by
choosing k 6= `.
The second statement follows from the contrapositive
of the second part of the previous lemma.
Having the previous lemma at hand, we prove that
the property of a function in being a (pseudo) process
function transfers to less parties.
Theorem 2. If ω is an (2 ≤ n)-party process function,
then ∀k, fk : ωfk is an n− 1-party process function. The
same holds for pseudo process functions.
Proof. Let ω be a process function. This means that ∀f :
ω ◦ f has at least one fixed point. By using the first part
of Lemma 2, we get that for all k, f : ωfk ◦ f\k has at
least one fixed point as well.
Let ω be a pseudo process function. In this case, we
have that ∀f : ω ◦ f has at most one fixed point. As-
sume towards a contradiction that there exists some k
and some f , such that ωfk ◦ f\k has two or more fixed
points. Then, by the second part of Lemma 2, ω ◦ f has
two or more fixed points as well, which, by definition,
cannot be the case.
A. Existence of unique fixed point
We can now use the results from the previous section
in order to prove Theorem 1.
Proof. We prove this theorem for (pseudo) process func-
tions via the n-dependent propositions
P [n] : ω is an n-party process function
=⇒
∀f : ω ◦ f has a unique fixed point,
Q[n] : ω is an n-party pseudo process function
=⇒
∀f : ω ◦ f has a unique fixed point,
and by induction over the number of parties, i.e., we
prove P [n] =⇒ P [n+ 1] as well as Q[n] =⇒ Q[n+ 1].
Process functions. Towards a contradiction assume
that P [n+ 1] is false. The negation of P [n+ 1] is
ω is an (n+ 1)-party process function ∧
∃f : ω ◦ f has two or more fixed points.
Let f be such that ω ◦ f has two or more fixed points.
Now, by Theorem 2, for any choice of k, ωfk is an n-
party process function. Furthermore, by the first part of
Corollary 3, there exists some k such that ωfk ◦ f\k has
two or more fixed points as well: P [n] is false.
Pseudo process function. Again, assume that Q[n+ 1]
is false, and let f be such that ω ◦ f has no fixed point.
By Theorem 2, we also have that for any choice of k, ωfk
7is an n-party pseudo process function. Now, we use the
second part of Corollary 3 and we see that for any k the
function ωfk ◦f\k has no fixed point: Q[n] is false as well.
Both cases, however, stand in contrast to Corollary 2
(the base case): Single-party (pseudo) process functions
have a unique fixed point.
By this theorem we also observe that the set of process
function (which equals the set of pseudo process func-
tions) is the set of classical and deterministic process-
matrices [19, 30]. Note, that by Ref. [30], these (pseudo)
process functions can always be embedded into reversible
functions as well. Finally, examples of cyclic causal
structures with interventions are known that produce
dynamics incompatible with any acyclic causal struc-
ture [24, 26, 30].
V. EQUIVALENCE OF GRANDFATHER AND
INFORMATION ANTINOMY
We prove our main statement, namely that the grand-
father and the information antinomy are equivalent under
intervention (see Corollary 1).
Proof. Let our causal structure be such that no grandfa-
ther antinomy arises, and let ω be the induced function.
This means, by definition, that if we perform any inter-
vention f , then ω ◦ f always has at least one fixed point.
By Theorem 1, for every f , the fixed point is unique. This
again implies the absence of the information antinomy
for ω. The same holds in the other direction. Suppose
the causal structure to be such that it’s induced func-
tion ω does not suffer from the information antinomy.
By definition again, this means that for every choice of
intervention f , the function ω ◦ f has at most one fixed
point. Then, by the same theorem, it follows that ω ◦ f
always has one fixed point: The grandfather antinomy
never arises.
VI. CONCLUSION AND OUTLOOK
Following an intervention-based approach to causality,
we have shown that the grandfather antinomy is equiv-
alent to the information antinomy—in the classical case.
These antinomies might only arise in cyclic causal struc-
tures. Cyclic causal structure have recently become a
research topic again (see, e.g., Refs. [19, 26] and related
work). Cyclic causal structures, however, have a longer
history: Since it is known that general relativity allows
for time travel, people have been concerned about their
consequences and looked for arguments against such a
behaviour. The strongest argument is the grandfather
antinomy, i.e., dynamics that lead to a logical contra-
diction. Another argument, yet often neglected, is the
information antinomy, where too many consistent solu-
tions to the dynamics exist. Here, we have shown that
both problems are the same: If it were possible to gener-
ate a logical contradiction, then it would also be possible
to generate a multitude of consistent solution, and vice
versa. By showing this equivalence, we are confronted
with taking the information antinomy as seriously as the
grandfather antinomy. This also motivates to exclude the
information antinomy from other models [27]. However,
both antinomies cannot be used as arguments to rule out
cyclic causal structures [25].
Open questions are to what extend we can maintain
this equivalence for probabilistic as well as for quantum
causal models. As for probabilistic models, we could aug-
ment every vertex v in the graph by a vertex v′ with zero
in degree and an edge from v′ to v, such that the “noise”
is transferred from v′ to v [26, 33]. If “fine-tuning” were
forbidden, i.e., if the properties of an induced function
being a (pseudo) process function does not change un-
der the probabilities injected at the augmented vertexes,
then we suspect the same result to hold as well. The
quantum case is more problematic. The reason for this
is that it is not obvious on how to define both antinomies:
What does it mean that the grandfather antinomy arises
in a cyclic quantum causal structure? The approach—as
we did here—via fixed points does not go through: En-
tanglement poses a problem. Phrased in a time-traveling
context: If a quantum state time travels to the past, then
it might still be entangled to a system in the future—
temporal entanglement enters the picture and contrasts
entanglement monogamy [35].
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We acknowledge support by the Austrian Science
Found (FWF): Z3. A¨.B. is also supported by the Erwin
Schro¨dinger Center for Quantum Science & Technology
(ESQ), and the Austrian Science Found (FWF): F71.
[1] A. Einstein, in Sitzungsberichte der Ko¨niglich Preussis-
chen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Vol. Zweiter Halb-
band, edited by G. Reimer (Verlag der Ko¨niglichen
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Berlin, 1914) pp. 1030–
1085.
[2] A. Einstein, in The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein,
Vol. 8: The Berlin Years: Correspondence, 1914–1918:
Part A: 1914–1917, edited by R. Schulmann, A. J. Kox,
M. Janssen, and J. Illy (Princeton University Press,
1998) Chap. Document 255, pp. 334–335, letter sent on
September 6, 1916.
[3] A. Einstein, in The Collected Papers of Albert Einstein,
Vol. 8: The Berlin Years: Correspondence, 1914–1918:
Part A: 1914–1917, edited by R. Schulmann, A. J. Kox,
8M. Janssen, and J. Illy (Princeton University Press,
1998) Chap. Document 284, pp. 375–376, letter sent on
December 10, 1916.
[4] K. Lanczos, Zeitschrift fu¨r Physik 21, 73 (1924).
[5] W. J. van Stockum, Proceedings of the Royal Society of
Edinburgh 57, 135 (1938).
[6] K. Go¨del, Reviews of Modern Physics 21, 447 (1949).
[7] J. Friedman, M. S. Morris, I. D. Novikov, F. Echever-
ria, G. Klinkhammer, K. S. Thorne, and U. Yurtsever,
Physical Review D 42, 1915 (1990).
[8] F. Echeverria, G. Klinkhammer, and K. S. Thorne, Phys-
ical Review D 44, 1077 (1991).
[9] I. D. Novikov, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical
Physics 68, 439 (1989).
[10] D. Deutsch, Physical Review D 44, 3197 (1991).
[11] C. H. Bennett and B. Schumacher, “Simulated time
travel, teleportation without communication, and how
to conduct a romance with someone who has fallen into
a black hole,” (2005), Talk at QUPON, 2005, Vienna,
Austria.
[12] D. T. Pegg, in Time’s Arrows, Quantum Measure-
ment and Superluminal Behavior, edited by D. Mugnai,
A. Ranfagni, and L. S. Schulman (Consiglio Nazionale
Delle Richerche, Roma, 2001) p. 113.
[13] G. Svetlichny, preprint arXiv:0902.4898 [quant-ph]
(2009).
[14] G. Svetlichny, International Journal of Theoretical
Physics 50, 3903 (2011).
[15] S. Lloyd, L. Maccone, R. Garcia-Patron, V. Giovannetti,
and Y. Shikano, Physical Review D 84, 025007 (2011).
[16] J.-M. A. Allen, Physical Review A 90, 042107 (2014).
[17] G. Chiribella, G. M. D’Ariano, and P. Perinotti, Physical
Review Letters 101, 060401 (2008).
[18] F. A. Pollock, C. Rodr´ıguez-Rosario, T. Frauenheim,
M. Paternostro, and K. Modi, Physical Review A 97,
012127 (2018), 1512.00589.
[19] O. Oreshkov, F. Costa, and Cˇ. Brukner, Nature Com-
munications 3, 1092 (2012).
[20] A¨. Baumeler and S. Wolf, in 2014 IEEE International
Symposium on Information Theory (IEEE, Piscataway,
2014) pp. 526–530.
[21] C. Branciard, M. Arau´jo, A. Feix, F. Costa, and
Cˇ. Brukner, New Journal of Physics 18, 013008 (2015).
[22] A. A. Abbott, C. Giarmatzi, F. Costa, and C. Branciard,
Physical Review A 94, 032131 (2016).
[23] A¨. Baumeler, A. Feix, and S. Wolf, Physical Review A
90, 042106 (2014).
[24] A¨. Baumeler and S. Wolf, New Journal of Physics 18,
013036 (2016).
[25] A¨. Baumeler, Causal Loops: Logically Consistent Corre-
lations, Time Travel, and Computation, Phd, Universita`
della Svizzera italiana (2017).
[26] J. Barrett, R. Lorenz, and O. Oreshkov, preprint
arXiv:2002.12157 [quant-ph] (2020).
[27] A¨. Baumeler and S. Wolf, Proceedings of the Royal Soci-
ety A: Mathematical, Physical and Engineering Science
474, 20170698 (2018).
[28] C. Smeenk and C. Wu¨thrich, in The Oxford Handbook
of Philosophy of Time, edited by C. Callender (Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 2011) Chap. 20, p. 39.
[29] A¨. Baumeler, F. Costa, T. C. Ralph, S. Wolf, and
M. Zych, Classical and Quantum Gravity 36, 224002
(2019).
[30] A¨. Baumeler and S. Wolf, New Journal of Physics 18,
035014 (2016).
[31] J. Pearl, Causality (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
[32] J.-M. A. Allen, J. Barrett, D. C. Horsman, C. M. Lee,
and R. W. Spekkens, Physical Review X 7, 031021
(2017).
[33] J. Barrett, R. Lorenz, and O. Oreshkov, preprint
arXiv:1906.10726 [quant-ph] (2019).
[34] G. Tobar and F. Costa, preprint arXiv:2001.02511
[quant-ph] (2020).
[35] C. Marletto, V. Vedral, S. Virz`ı, E. Rebufello, A. Avella,
F. Piacentini, M. Gramegna, I. P. Degiovanni, and
M. Genovese, Nature Communications 10, 182 (2019).
